We investigate the optimal dynamic auction design for the display advertising industry. Currently, display advertising is sold through two markets side-by-side. In the traditional guaranteed market, the publisher commits to deliver a pre-specified number of impressions within a fixed time frame through a guaranteed contract. In the spot market, the publisher runs an auction to allocate the impressions, and the supply of heterogeneous impressions is highly uncertain and non-storable. We characterize the precise tradeoffs between extracting the revenue from the spot markets, materializing the instantaneous benefit shared with the guaranteed advertisers, and releasing the pressure of paying the penalty eventually. Furthermore, we identify the dual role of the publisher as a system designer and as a bidder on behalf of the guaranteed advertisers. With heterogeneous due dates of guaranteed contracts, we demonstrate the inherent scheduling issue and solve the joint scheduling and capacity allocation problem.
Introduction
Display advertising (ads), which includes banner ads, video ads and all non-text-based ads on web pages, generates about 25 billions of dollars annually in around 400 advertising networks and the analysts see a clear rising trend (McAfee et al. (2010) ). Currently, the display ads are sold through two channels/markets. In the traditional "guaranteed" market, advertisers negotiate with the publisher; once they enter an agreement, the publisher "commits" to deliver a pre-specified number of impressions within a fixed time frame through a guaranteed contract. This captures the idea that web page owners sell their banners to advertisers that would like to "hedge against future supply uncertainty," as exemplified by movie releases or new product launches (Ghosh et al. (2009) ). Numerous leading web page owners use this traditional way, including Microsoft's MSN.com and Yahoo!, and the time frame specified in a guaranteed contract ranges from days to up to one year. Another way to sell the display ads is through the spot market of an exchange environment, in which the publisher runs an auction to allocate the display ads space every period. A well-known example is RightMedia Exchange, which operates an auction market for impressions per pageview on every time epoch (with a total of nine billions of auctions on a daily basis). The bidding process is conducted on a real-time basis, and the bid submissions and winner determinations could be completed within seconds through automated computer systems.
The auctioned objects in this display ads industry are the impressions (or eyeballs) per pageview. Naturally, the resulting impressions crucially depend on the specific position/location at which the publisher displays the advertisement. As a snapshot, the website of New York Times has a banner right at the top of its front page and some side positions on the right lower column; conceivably, subscribers of New York Times pay more attention to the upfront banner than to those advertisements at the corner. Thus, one might attempt to sell the display ads based on the relative positions in the publisher's website, and award slots/positions to different advertisers according to their bids. This is certainly a common approach proposed by earlier research in various papers, including Edelman et al. (2007) , Liu et al. (2009), and Varian (2007) ; under this slot/position auction, the highest bidder wins the best slot available on the publisher's website, and the second highest bidder secures the second best slot, and so on.
However, Chen et al. (2009) propose a novel concept of "share auction" that defines the auctioned objects/resources as the aggregate exposure (impressions) generated by the publisher via all the available banners and slots, which may even involve display ads across different websites if a publisher runs multiple websites concurrently. Viewed in this way, the auction essentially determines the "share structure," i.e., how large a share should be allocated to/reserved for a specific advertiser. This share allocation is conducted based on the submitted bids, and may involve randomization or time-sharing over different slots in order to generate the specified impressions. As indicated by Chen et al. (2009) , this share auction honors the practical situation where nowadays there are much more advertisers (bidders) than available slots for most of the publishers. Additionally, it is possible that the franchise slot generates too much exposure compared to others, and the opportunity cost of awarding it to a single advertiser may be too high. On the other hand, several slots may generate similar exposures, as they are only minimally differentiated (e.g., the exposures of the seventh and eighth slots on the right column may be practically indistinguishable, and there might be no difference between the fifth slots on the left-hand and right-hand sides); these practical/technological limitations largely limit the publisher's ability to differentiate high and low value advertisers. Currently, online publishers have established fairly sophisticated methods to correctly estimate how impressions are attached to specific banners/slots among the subscribers that view their front pages. Preston McAfee, VP and Research Fellow of Yahoo! Research, indicates that Yahoo! is implementing the "fractional allocation" that utilizes rotational schemes as it coincides with the long-standing advertising concept known as "share of voice" (McAfee et al. (2010) ).
By its very nature, the "supply" of impressions is substantially uncertain and may change over time. For example, in June 2009 when Michael Jackson passed away, the frontpage of Yahoo! experienced humongous internet traffic as this breaking news attracted significant attention and was clearly unpredictable ex ante. Likewise, some spikes of internet traffic are likely to arise right after natural disasters (earthquakes and hurricanes), terrorism, scandals of political and/or movie stars. This is arguably one of the distinguishing features of display ads industry: compared to the classical auction models, the supply/capacity is either exogenously given and constant over time, or is endogenously chosen by the auctioneer with full control. Nevertheless, as the supply is measured based on the impressions, ex ante the publisher can only estimate his future supply over time. The second distinguishing feature is that the capacity is non-storable over time: as the supplies are generated from the impressions/eyeballs, the publisher has to decide how to allocate them immediately for otherwise they will perish in seconds.
Selling the impressions to potential advertisers is further complicated by the inherent heterogeneity of impressions. Advertisers may seek to reach a specific audience, e.g., 20 million females from California before sunset/when the sun is shining (the "happy contract" commonly used in the display ads industry) and when the stock market is up (e.g., Dow Jones Industrial Average has risen). Others may accept more loosely defined, less targeted eyeballs (females, California, sunshine, etc.) . With the help of current information technology, this becomes easily implementable. The detailed composition of the display ads specifications is fairly complicated, and numerous combinations may arise. According to McAfee et al. (2010) , based on the heterogeneous requests by their current advertisers, Yahoo! faces three trillions of different combinations, and any contemporary combinatorial auction methods are practically not helpful in facilitating efficient/revenue maximizing dynamic allocations. Furthermore, different impressions sold in different spot markets may not be equally valuable from the advertisers' viewpoint. Thus, various publishers have taken into account the "representativeness" of the impressions across different geographic locations, supply types, and other target attributes (McAfee et al. (2010) ).
This paper attempts to study the optimal dynamic auction design for display ads, taking into account the uncertain supplies and demands, the heterogeneous impressions, the desire of representativeness, and the interplay between the guaranteed markets and various spot markets. In pursuit of this goal, we construct a stylized model in which a monopolistic online publisher intends to sell his display advertising space sequentially in two markets. In the first market, a set of long-term "guaranteed" advertisers negotiate with the publisher; once they enter an agreement, the publisher "commits" to deliver a pre-specified number of impressions within a fixed time frame through a guaranteed contract. In the second market, new advertisers arrive and express their interest in the display ads. This market, labeled as the "spot" market, runs an auction to allocate the display ads space every period among the short-lived advertisers. We discretize the time horizon and assume that the capacity/supply of impressions are uncertain, and the aggregate number of advertisers is random and time-varying. Given the dynamic nature and the unpredictable supply of the display ads industry, even in the "guaranteed" contract, the publisher cannot promise that a certain amount of impressions will be delivered within a time frame for sure. Thus, the guaranteed contract specifies a per unit penalty if the promised impressions are not delivered ultimately. In addition, we allow the publisher to partially share the instantaneous benefit from the guaranteed advertiser upon successfully delivering the promised impressions over time. This benevolence may be rationalized by the fact that the publisher is engaged in the long-term contractual relationship with the guaranteed advertiser. We adopt the mechanism design approach to characterize the optimal dynamic selling scheme in its most general form.
We first investigate the scenario with a single guaranteed contract and homogeneous impressions. In such a scenario, we show that the optimal dynamic allocation problem balances the tradeoffs between extracting the revenue from the spot market, materializing the instantaneous benefit shared with the guaranteed advertiser, and releasing the pressure of paying the penalty eventually. In the presence of information asymmetry, the publisher acts as a bidder against the active advertisers and intentionally allocates too much to the guaranteed contract in every period. On one hand, the publisher cares about his own pressure of delivering the guaranteed impressions before the due date; on the other hand, due to the benefit sharing, the publisher also intends to apply impressions immediately to capitalize on the instantaneous benefit for the guaranteed advertiser. Collectively, the publisher, as a system designer, constructs the mechanism in order to achieve the revenue-maximizing allocation for the perishable impressions, and at the same time participates in the bidding process to pull back some impressions for the guaranteed contract. The optimal dynamic allocation can be implemented by a payment schedule under which each active advertiser submits a quantity request, and in some special cases the allocations are rather straightforward. Further, the payment schedule can be appropriately designed to conceal the information of active advertisers from the advertisers.
We next incorporate the possibility of heterogeneous impressions. While in practice the detailed composition of the display ads specifications is fairly complicated, our goal is to start with the most parsimonious setup that allows us to provide an analytical formulation and derive the optimal allocation. In such a scenario, there are multiple spot markets, each of which is selling a specific type of impressions, and the supplies of all the spot markets can be applied to fulfill the guaranteed contract. The impressions in different spot markets may not be equally valuable from the guaranteed advertiser's viewpoint, and we introduce the market-specific benefits to accommodate the "representativeness" of the impressions across different geographic locations, supply types, and other target attributes (McAfee et al. (2010) ). While allowing all sorts of heterogeneities regarding the supplies, demands, and advertisers' attributes across different spot markets, we provide an analytical characterization of the optimal dynamic selling scheme that gives a precise illustration of how the publisher should trade off various sources of economic forces.
Finally, we investigate the publisher's dynamic capacity allocation problem with multiple guaranteed contracts. The heterogeneity among guaranteed contracts, in particular the various due dates, significantly complicates the dynamic allocation problem, because it gives rise to a scheduling problem embedded in this dynamic revenue maximization context. We find that with homogeneous benefits/penalties, and time-invariant benevolence, the embedded scheduling problem has a fairly simple solution: allocating the residual impressions to guaranteed contracts with the earliest due dates. This allows the publisher to avoid early punishments and the remaining contract may still be fulfilled in a later period. We next find that, with homogeneous due dates, it is sometimes possible to recast the dynamic capacity allocation so that all the unmet requests in the guaranteed contracts are summarized in a single variable -the aggregate impressions yet to be fulfilled. This allows us to treat this dynamic allocation problem with multiple guaranteed contracts as a simplified problem with a single aggregate guaranteed contract; this "state space collapse" largely simplifies the dynamic programming computation and may serve as an interesting guideline in its own right. Additionally, we also show how our results may be applied directly to the case with nonlinear penalties for non-delivery and/or bonuses for excess delivery.
We organize the rest of this paper as follows. In Section 2, we lay out the basic model with a single guaranteed contract. Section 3 derives the optimal dynamic selling scheme. In Section 4, we investigate the scenario with multiple guaranteed contracts. Section 5 provides some concluding remarks. All the proofs are relegated to the online appendix.
Model
We consider a model in which a monopolistic online publisher intends to sell his display ads space sequentially in two markets. In the first market, a long-term guaranteed advertiser negotiates with the publisher; once they enter an agreement, the publisher commits to deliver a pre-specified number of impressions within a fixed time frame, denoted by T , through a guaranteed contract. Initially, we consider only one guaranteed contract; later, in Section 4, we amend our model to incorporate multiple guaranteed contracts. In the second market, new advertisers arrive and express their interest in the display ads. This market, labeled as the "spot" market, runs an auction to allocate the display ads space every period. To conceptualize the operations of these two markets, we discretize the time horizon. For ease of presentation, we index the time backwards, i.e., t = 1 is the deadline, and t = T is the beginning of the game. Thus, a smaller value of t indicates a later time epoch. For ease of exposition, in our basic model we focus on a single spot market, and relegate the investigation of the scenarios with multiple spot markets to Section 3.2.
The auctioned objects in this display ads industry are the impressions per pageview, and we follow the share structure concept proposed by Chen et al. (2009) to treat the auctioned objects/resources as the aggregate impressions generated by the publisher via all the available banners and slots. By its very nature, the supply of impressions is highly uncertain and may change over time; ex ante the publisher can only estimate his future supply. The second distinguishing feature is that the capacity is non-storable over time. To capture this uncertainty, we assume that the supply in each period t is random, denoted by C t , with some prior distribution. Given the dynamic nature and the unpredictable supply, the guaranteed advertiser and the publisher specify a detailed penalty scheme if the promised impressions are not delivered ultimately. Initially, we use p to denote the per unit penalty for the unsuccessful delivery of impressions at the end of this time frame (t = 0). This notion of constant per unit penalty is in line with the recent literature on the online ads design with cancellations and buy-backs. The case with nonlinear penalties is discussed in Section 4. Furthermore, although in practice the guaranteed contract only specifies the penalty for non-delivery, our analysis can be extended to the case in which the guaranteed advertiser pays the bonus to the publisher if the delivered impressions exceed the pre-specified amount (see Section 4).
We assume that the publisher shares a portion of the benefit from the guaranteed advertiser upon successfully delivering the promised impressions over time. Specifically, we use γ t R t (x) to represent this shared benefit, where R t (x) is the guaranteed advertiser's instantaneous benefit if x impressions are delivered in period t, and γ t ∈ [0, 1] measures how benevolent the publisher is in this regard. When γ t = 0, the publisher cares only about his own expected payoff; on the other extreme, γ t = 1 implies that the incentives of the publisher and the guaranteed advertiser are aligned. This benevolence may be rationalized by the fact that the publisher is engaged in the long-term contractual relationship with the guaranteed advertiser. As Ghosh et al. (2009) report, the guaranteed contracts are much more profitable from the publisher's viewpoint, and consequently Yahoo! has recently developed a sophisticated bidding scheme to improve the welfare of the advertisers' guaranteed contracts. Our flexible framework thus allows us to capture some strategic concerns of the publisher beyond the short-term monetary incentives. We assume that R t (x) is increasing ((R t ) (x) ≥ 0) and concave ((R t ) (x) ≤ 0) to model the diminishing marginal benefit of the guaranteed advertiser.
In addition to the supply uncertainty, we assume that the publisher also faces the aggregate demand uncertainty in each period while entering the spot market. Specifically, in period t, let potential advertisers (of period t) be indexed by the natural numbers {1, 2, ...}, and let β t A denote the probability that a finite subset A are active advertisers. For ease of presentation, we assume that with probability one the set of active advertisers is finite. The probabilities {β t A }'s are commonly known to each advertiser; they exogenously determine the selection process of the active advertisers and consequently the number of active advertisers faced by the publisher. Thus, from an ex ante perspective, the publisher faces an aggregate uncertainty regarding the population of active advertisers. As a special case, if β t A = 1 for some set A, then the aggregate uncertainty vanishes and the problem degenerates to the classical game in which the set of active advertisers is common knowledge.
In the spot market, each active advertiser is assumed to be short-lived. That is, she must purchase the display ads immediately in order to capitalize on her business opportunity; otherwise, this utility vanishes and she leaves the market permanently. Thus, the publisher essentially faces different generations of new advertisers in the spot market period by period. This assumption is appropriate as typically the bidding processes are automated and must be completed on a real-time basis. In such a scenario, it would be difficult for the advertisers to strategize over time promptly unless human decision making process is sufficiently fast to adaptively adjust their bids in seconds. This is crucial as the supply of impressions perishes immediately. To model the heterogeneity across active advertisers in each period, we use V t i (x i , θ t i ) to denote the utility of advertiser i that are active in period t, where x i is the amount (quantity) of impressions awarded to the advertiser and θ t i serves as an index of her willingness to pay. In compliance of the mechanism design literature, we adopt the following assumption. 
Assumption 1. The first and second derivatives of V
Confronted with the guaranteed contract, the uncertain, time-varying supplies, and the multiple generations of new advertisers in different periods, the publisher's goal is to design an appropriate dynamic mechanism that maximizes his payoff. We assume that the publisher is risk neutral (i.e., an expected payoff maximizer), and discounts the future at a (potentially time-varying) rate δ t . In the presence of information asymmetry regarding the advertisers' private willingness to pay, the publisher faces an adverse selection problem. Thus, according to the agency theory, he should design an appropriate mechanism that elicits information from the advertisers voluntarily. While the set of possible selling schemes is enormously huge, we can invoke the revelation principle to confine our search within the family of direct revelation mechanisms. In these direct revelation mechanisms, the publisher simply requests the advertisers to report their private information and selects the allocations and payments accordingly. We normalize the reservation utility for the advertisers to zero, regardless of their willingness to pay.
The sequence of events proceeds as follows. At the beginning of the game, the publisher is endowed with a guaranteed contract that specifies the promised impressions, the due date, and the penalty cost. Next, the spot market opens. In each period, Nature selects a subset of advertisers to be active (denoted as A) and the amount of available impressions in this period C t is realized. Each active advertiser privately observes her willingness to pay (θ t i ), and inactive advertisers receive a null payoff and leave the game. Afterwards, the publisher requests the advertisers to report their {θ t i }'s (whereas inactive advertisers can and will choose not to respond at all). Accordingly, he determines the quantities of impressions that each advertiser i will be awarded, labeled as x tA i (θ t i , θ t −i ), and the corresponding payment scheme {m tA i (θ t i , θ t −i )}'s. In the end (t = 0), the publisher compensates the guaranteed advertiser for guaranteed impressions that are not delivered successfully. In the next section, we characterize the optimal dynamic selling scheme.
Optimal dynamic selling schemes
In this section, we first start with our basic model with a single spot market. Following this, we then amend our setting to incorporate heterogeneous impressions that are sold in multiple spot markets.
Single spot market
To characterize the optimal selling scheme in this game, we shall start with the advertisers' reporting strategies. In the direct revelation mechanism, it is without loss of generality to focus on the equilibrium in which each active advertiser reports truthfully. However, we need to ensure that no profitable deviation may arise. Suppose an active advertiser i's true type is θ t i but she reports it as w i . Assuming that all other active advertisers report truthfully, advertiser i's expected payoff based on this reporting strategy is
where the misreport w i affects not only the allocation
In equilibrium, truth-telling must be induced, i.e., the advertiser is weakly better off reporting her true type, thereby leading to the following incentive compatibility (IC) constraint:
Moreover, the mechanism must induce each active advertiser to participate; consequently, the following individual rationality (IR) constraint must hold:
Finally, since the capacity is non-storable and the supply is generated exogenously, the following feasibility (F) constraint must be satisfied:
Let us now return to the publisher's problem. In this dynamic environment, the publisher's payoff certainly depends on the number of impressions yet to be delivered to the guaranteed advertiser. Denote this as q t and the expected discounted payoff at period t as Π t (q t ). Define
as the vector of realized types for active advertisers, where we suppress the index of set A for brevity. From the above discussions, we can formulate the publisher's problem in period t as follows:
(IR), (IC), and (F),
where m tA i (θ t i , θ t −i ) corresponds to the payment collected from an active advertiser i, and C t − i∈A x tA i (θ t i , θ t −i ) is the (leftover) amount of impressions allocated to the guaranteed contract. Note that as the per-period supply is non-storable, it is clear that any unused impressions should be applied to the guaranteed contract yet to be satisfied. In the next proposition, we provide a characterization of the optimal within-period allocation.
Proposition 1. With a single guaranteed contract and a single spot market, the optimal allocation is jointly determined by the following condition:
is the endogenous shadow price. The corresponding payment is
Proposition 1 characterizes the optimal allocation in each period and the corresponding payment scheme. Let us first start with the shadow price µ(θ t i , θ t −i ). Recall that C t − i∈A x tA i (θ t i , θ t −i ) represents the leftover impressions that are applied to the guaranteed contract. Thus,
) is precisely the discounted marginal cost for not allocating an incremental impression to the guaranteed contract, as it would otherwise release the pressure of paying the penalty eventually. Additionally, by awarding this impression to the short-lived advertisers, the publisher sacrifices the instantaneous benefit that the guaranteed advertiser can obtain and the associated benefit share he himself is entitled with (as depicted by γ t (R t ) (C t − i∈A x tA i (θ t i , θ t −i ))). Collectively, these two economic forces determine the marginal cost of allocating the impression in favor of the short-lived advertisers in the spot market. This marginal cost, also known as the shadow price in the optimization literature, is endogenously determined by the allocation in this period, and the subsequent demand and supply uncertainties; further, it also incorporates the publisher's anticipated optimal allocations from then on, as the value-to-go function Π t−1 itself is an outcome of a dynamic programming optimization.
In (2), the optimal allocation x tA i (θ t i , θ t −i ) depends not only on the endogenous shadow price but also on the term
, which has an intuitive interpretation. If the publisher knew the active advertisers' types, he would allocate the impressions to maximize the aggregate surplus. Thus, as the marginal cost of incremental impressions is summarized by µ(θ t i , θ t −i ), the marginal benefit comes from the gross benefit enjoyed by the winning advertiser (
) thus accounts for the distortion due to the information asymmetry. When the publisher has no access to the advertisers' private willingness to pay, he intends to distort the allocation in order to facilitate truth revelation at the minimum expense. It can be verified that the solution
is lower than the complete information solution; thus, the publisher allocates too much to the guaranteed contract every period in the presence of information asymmetry. This echoes the classical efficiency and rent-extraction tradeoff, albeit in a dynamic setting. In the next subsection, we extend our model to incorporate heterogeneous impressions.
Multiple spot markets
Now we assume that the impressions are heterogeneous and thus are sold through multiple spot markets concurrently; the supplies of all the spot markets can be applied to fulfill the guaranteed contract. These impressions in different spot markets may not be equally valuable from the guaranteed advertiser's viewpoint. Thus, as pioneered by Yahoo!, various publishers have taken into account the "representativeness" of the impressions. To model this representativeness aspect, we assume that the guaranteed advertiser collects instantaneous benefit R jt (x jt ) from x jt impressions in spot market j ∈ J in period t, where R jt (x jt ) is increasing and concave. Thus, j∈J R jt (x jt ) corresponds to the aggregate instantaneous benefit of the guaranteed advertiser across spot market. It could also correspond to how the impressions delivery is penalized if the advertising campaign cannot readily substitute. For example, a lipstick campaign is presumably attractive only to females; if delivered to a mixed gender group, it results in not only a waste of resource, but also a potential counteraction from the wrong groups that find it offensive (McAfee et al. (2010) ). Our results go through if a more general function is introduced to incorporate the interdependence (i.e., a benefit function R t ({x jt }) that is jointly concave in the vector {x jt }).
Naturally, the supplies and demands for these heterogeneous spot markets could differ a lot. For this matter, we shall introduce market-specific supply and demand processes to account for these heterogeneities. We assume that the supply in each period t is random, denoted by C jt , with some prior distribution G jt (C jt ), where the superscript j indicates the specific spot market. Likewise, let β jt A denote the probability that a finite subset A are active advertisers in spot market j in period t, and V . We will again apply the revelation principle and focus exclusively on the family of direct revelation mechanisms. The sequence of events is the same, except that now the publisher operates multiple spot markets concurrently. Thus, the capacity allocation is not only dynamic but also across multiple markets. We add the superscript j to all the terms defined in our basic model to indicate the spot markets, including, for example,
To characterize the optimal selling scheme in this game, we shall start with the advertisers' reporting strategies. Suppose an active advertiser i in spot market j in period t has willingness to pay θ jt i but she reports it as w i . In such a scenario, her expected payoff based on this reporting strategy is
In equilibrium, the following incentive constraints must hold:
and the feasibility constraint becomes:
Let us now return to the publisher's problem. For ease of notation, define E {C jt ,A,θ jt } as the expectation over all possible realizations of supplies, active sets, and types of active advertisers across spot markets. The publisher's objective function is as follows:
(IR-2), (IC-2), and (F-2),
where
jt −i ) corresponds to the collected payments, and
) summarizes the (leftover) amount of impressions from these spot markets that can be applied to the guaranteed contract. The auxiliary notation E {C jt ,A,θ jt } is adopted to avoid double counting for the value function δ t Π t−1 across spot markets. In the next proposition, we provide a characterization of the optimal within-period allocation.
Proposition 2. With a single guaranteed contract and heterogeneous spot markets, the optimal allocation is jointly determined by the following condition:
is the corresponding shadow price.
As demonstrated in Proposition 2, the optimal allocation balances the marginal cost for not applying the impressions to the guaranteed contract and the marginal revenue extracted from the (short-lived) advertisers in the spot markets. It is worth noting that in deriving the shadow price µ j (θ jt i , θ jt −i ), we uncover the market specific component (as captured by γ t (R jt ) (·)), and the common component that results from the pressure of not meeting the contractual guarantee eventually (i.e., δ t (Π t−1 ) (·)). Likewise, we can also construct an alternative payment schedule that conceals the set of active advertisers. Having characterized the optimal dynamic auction with a single guaranteed contract, we next switch to a more realistic setting in which multiple guaranteed contracts are agreed upon between the publisher and guaranteed advertisers.
Multiple guaranteed contracts
In this section, we investigate the scenario in which the publisher signs guaranteed contracts with multiple (S) guaranteed advertisers. These multiple guaranteed contracts may specify different impressions as well as different time frames. To model these heterogeneous contracts, we use t 1 , ..., t S to denote the pre-specified time frames from the negotiation outcomes vis-a-vis the guaranteed advertisers. Without loss of generality, we assume that t 1 ≥ ... ≥ t S = 0, i.e., the guaranteed contract S has the latest due date, which coincides with the planning horizon for ease of notation. Further, let C s ⊆ J denote the set of impressions that are acceptable for guaranteed contract s. If they prescribe the same impressions, C s = J, ∀s = 1, ..., S.
Heterogeneous due dates
In our first special case, we assume that the guaranteed advertiser s collects instantaneous benefit R sjt (x sjt ) = Rx sjt from x sjt impressions in spot market j in period t, and γ represents the publisher's (common) benevolence with respect to guaranteed advertiser. This common benevolence factor may correspond to the publisher's company-wide mission in how much they value the clients with long-term collaboration (see a similar argument in McAfee et al. (2010)). The guaranteed contracts specify the same penalty p and the same kind of impressions (C s = J with different quantities). We again focus on direct revelation mechanisms and use the same sequence of events. In the spot markets, the short-term advertisers' problems and strategies are exactly the same; thus, we omit the details and recall (IC-2), (IR-2) and (F-2) directly. The publisher's problem, however, is more complicated. Confronted with multiple guaranteed contracts with different due dates, we can no longer use a single variable to summarize the current state. Thus, we define the expected discounted payoff at period t as Π t (q t ), where the vector q t ≡ {q st } indicates the numbers of impressions left undelivered to each guaranteed advertiser. Let Π t s (q t ) ≡ ∂Π t (q t )/∂q st denote the partial derivative associated with the s-th argument. To save notation, if t s > t, i.e., the due date for delivering to guaranteed advertiser s has passed, we simply define q st = 0. Given this definition, we can then formulate the publisher's problem as follows:
(IR-2), (IC-2), and (F-2), and
where Q sj depicts the impressions of spot market j allocated to guaranteed contract s. From (P3), we observe that in the presence of multiple guaranteed advertisers, the publisher faces an additional layer of decision making: the allocation across different guaranteed contracts. Since they specify different due dates, it turns out to be a scheduling problem embedded in the revenue maximization problem. The results are summarized in the next proposition. Define 1{·} as the indicator function. 
are the corresponding shadow prices.
Proposition 3 shows that with homogeneous benefits/penalties, and time-invariant benevolence, the embedded scheduling problem has a fairly simple solution: allocating the residual impressions to guaranteed contracts with the earliest due dates (EDD rule). Specifically, for any scheduling rule that does not conform the EDD rule, we can always locally adjust the schedule; this strategy unambiguously improves the publisher's payoff as it allows the publisher to avoid early punishments and the remaining contract may still be fulfilled in a later period. In (5), the indicator depicts that in period t the publisher completely fulfills the guaranteed contracts up to the (s − 1) − th one; contracts that have expired are automatically excluded based on the above construction. The marginal impression affects only the incremental future value of the guaranteed contract to which it would be applied. Given the specific shadow prices for the spot markets, the allocations become rather straightforward. Additionally, we can construct an alternative payment schedule that conceals the set of active advertisers.
Heterogeneous penalties
Our second special case assumes that every guaranteed contract has the same due date (t = 0), each guaranteed advertiser targets the same kind of impressions (C s = J) with the same timeinvariant benefit function (R sjt (x sjt ) = Rx sjt ), and the publisher puts the same weight (γ) over all guaranteed contracts. Thus, in this scenario we merely introduce the heterogeneous penalty function p j . We find that the procedure proposed in Proposition 2 can be directly applied to solve this problem. Corollary 1. Suppose that every guaranteed contract has the same due date, each guaranteed advertiser has the same time-invariant benefit function, and the publisher puts the same weight over all guaranteed contracts. In the optimal allocation, the publisher always fulfills the guaranteed contract with the highest penalty first, and the optimal allocation is identical to that stated in Proposition 2.
The proof of Corollary 1 suggests that we can conveniently summarize all the unmet requests in the guaranteed contracts in a single variable -the aggregate impressions yet to be fulfilled. This allows us to treat this dynamic allocation problem with multiple guaranteed contracts as a simplified problem with a single aggregate guaranteed contract, where the penalty for unmet requests exhibits increasing marginal cost feature. This "state space collapse" largely simplifies the dynamic programming computation and may serve as an interesting guideline in its own right. The same argument can apply directly to incorporate nonlinear penalties and bonuses.
Heterogeneous impressions
Now we introduce the heterogeneous impressions across different guaranteed contracts. In such a scenario, C s = J, for some s. We can conveniently define R sjt (x sjt ) = Rx sjt 1{j ∈ C s } so that the guaranteed advertiser collects a benefit if an acceptable impression is applied to her contract and receives nothing otherwise. This allows us to slightly modifies the scheduling rules in the above cases. For example, if in addition to the heterogeneous impressions, the only heterogeneity arises from the due dates. The publisher's problem can be formulated as follows: (P4 Following a similar argument to the proof of Proposition 3, we can pairwise interchange the contracts that accept the same spot market but have different penalties. Note that these guaranteed contracts need not specify the same impression; instead, for each spot market, we compare the guaranteed contracts that accept the impressions from this particular spot market and allocate the residual impressions to the one with the earliest due dates. Proceeding in this way over every spot market, we can pin down the detailed scheduling rule in every period sample path wise. Afterwards, the allocation across different spot markets follows directly from the marginal cost-benefit analysis, and the details are omitted to avoid redundancy. Now suppose that the additional heterogeneity comes from the penalties ({p j }). In this case, we can again follow the same procedure proposed in Proposition 2, with the modification that the scheduling rule and allocation applies market by market. In other words, for each spot market, among the guaranteed contracts that are yet to be completely delivered and accept the impressions of this market, the publisher always fulfills the guaranteed contract with the highest penalty first. Likewise, this result is not prone to whether the penalties are constant per unit or nonlinear in nature. As the proofs are almost identical to those in the appendix, we omit the details.
Conclusions and discussions
In this paper, we investigate the optimal dynamic auction design for display advertising industry. We introduce the interplay between the guaranteed and spot markets, and characterize the precise tradeoffs between extracting the revenue from the spot markets, materializing the instantaneous benefit shared with the guaranteed advertisers, and releasing the pressure of paying the penalty eventually. Through our analysis, we uncover the dual role of the publisher. As a bidder against the advertisers in the spot markets, the publisher intends to release his own pressure of delivering the guaranteed impressions before the end period and redeems the instantaneous benefit sharing. On the other hand, the publisher, as a system designer, designs the mechanism in order to achieve the revenue-maximizing allocation. In the presence of multiple guaranteed contracts with heterogeneous due dates, we demonstrate the inherent scheduling issue embedded in this dynamic revenue management problem, and completely solve the joint scheduling and capacity allocation problem for some special cases. Overall, our results speak to the dynamic revenue management for display advertising in the presence of demand/supply uncertainties and heterogeneous markets.
